Debating Revolution, Gambling on Coups: Party Debates over the Role of Soldiers in Syrian and Iraqi Revolution

Soldiers and political elites in the Middle East have joined forces to stage coups since at least the Ottoman Young Turk movement. This activity is as puzzling as it is common. When civilians advocate for coups they not only put their followers and constituents at risk but also violate socio-political norms prohibiting the armed forces's entrance into civilian political affairs. This essay demonstrates that revolutionary post-colonial Syrian and Iraqi party leaders (e.g., Ba'thists, Syrian and Iraqi Communists, Arab Socialists, Syrian Social Nationalists) were well aware of their normative transgressions and expressed discomfort with inviting soldiers into politics. Their concern stemmed from contestation typical of any new nation-state: its development demarcated an analytical boundary between civilian elites and soldiers who were meant to serve the state. The essay is centered around these political figures' internal and public deliberations about the proper role that soldiers should play in their revolutionary movements. The Turkish coup movement, *Yön-Devrim*, is also discussed by way of comparison. Research for the study is based on a variety of primary sources, such as Arabic language newspapers, biographies, and memoirs; de-classified CIA memos; British Foreign Office records; documents from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The article also draws extensively on secondary historical accounts.

These deliberations reveal two important insights about post-colonial Arab politics. First, although Syrian and Iraqi coup advocates had internalized an anti-coup norm, expressing unease with using army partisans to stage coups, their hatred for existing regimes led them to gamble on coup conspiracies. This implies low legitimacy for the post-colonial state in both Syria and Iraq. Civilian politicians felt little attachment to the existing structure of newly established nation-states and wished to overthrow establishment politicians. Ultimately, each political faction desired a reconstruction of the state in their own ideological image. In short, these civilians wagered that

they had more in common with soldiers who joined their conspiratorial networks than they did with incumbent civilians. This dynamic is evident in contemporary Arab politics. In July 2013, Egyptian businesspersons and politicians who aligned with officers to oust Mohammed Morsi felt they had more in common with like-minded soldiers than they did with their Islamist counterparts. Second, the study revises earlier iterations of research on post-colonial coup cascades in Iraq and Syria. The most common version of this history is that ambitious officers seized power to establish order in the face of crises caused by inept civilian politicians. This essay indicates that a subgroup of civilian elites and soldiers produced political *disorder* as equal partners in revolutionary political movements.

The essay proceeds as follows. I review existing literature on post-colonial Arab coup politics in the following section. The next section discusses how the separation between civilians and soldiers, since the rise of the modern nation-state, has led to confusion about the nature of coups in the post-colonial Middle East. Following this theoretical discussion, the essay turns to studies of post-colonial Syria and Iraq. I also include a brief section on revolutionary Turkish coup politics to illustrate that the dynamics discussed in this essay are not unique to the Arab world. Finally, I end with a brief section about why, despite their awareness of an anti-coup norm, civilian elites enlisted soldiers in coup politics.

Civilians, Soldiers, & Coup Politics in the Middle East

Studies on the post-colonial cascade of coups in the Arab world nearly unanimously acknowledge the role of political parties in these takeovers.[1] The literature does not, however, systematically analyze this behavior with a theoretical or regional scope. We are left with single case studies or passing mention of civilian involvement in coups.[2] Outside these brief notations and single case

studies, civilian elites in the Middle East have been portrayed as passive victims of coups like their Latin American, Asian, and African counterparts. Unfortunately, there is no single study current scholarship does not examine the topic in any detailed or systematic fashion. Civilians are portrayed as the passive, powerless victims of small groups of discontented or ambitious officers, who are almost always assumed to have taken the initiative for a given coup.[3]

The role of civilian party leaders in post-colonial Arab military coups is an immensely important topic of study because soldiers struggle to seize power without political support.[4] Political and ideological leaders can provide unknown generals greater socio-political capital than they themselves possess. Coup perpetrators with political support can wrap themselves in a party banner, thus carrying with them a social constituency and the semblance of ideological legitimacy. General Hafez al-Assad (Syria) and General Hassan al-Bakr (Iraq) both sought to legitimate their regimes with such a party façade. Civilian elites can disseminate ideas and propaganda, organize demonstrations in support of coups, co-opt or neutralize the bureaucracy, fund operations, and recruit civilian or military participants in coups. Civilians may even command allegiance from armed agents, especially lower-ranked soldiers, if they have a strong enough ideological following.[5] For instance, Akram al-Hawrani's strong base of support among the rank-and-file—which he achieved by infiltrating the Homs Military Academy—allowed him to lead the so-called Qatana Mutiny/*'Isyan Qatana* in 1957.[6]

There is evidence that soldiers consider political support before attempting coups.[7] British Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr correctly noted that Iraqi General Bakr al-Sidqi could not have seized power in 1936, "unless he had been sure of the support of such men as [politician] Hikmat Sulaiman…*who could carry with them a large volume of public opinion*."[8] Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu (2017, 60) make a similar argument about the failure of the July 2016 coup in Turkey.

In short, civilians should be central to our understanding of military coups because they make powerful allies for the conduct of coups. While soldiers are best suited for the physical seizure of power, civilian political elites possess skills and resources that are well-suited for socio-political advocacy.

Yet civilian coup advocacy is puzzling behavior because it violates socio-political norms and is physically dangerous. Understanding the phenomenon thus requires a re-imagination of what constitutes "normal" civil-military relationships. Indeed, civilians have likely been largely overlooked in coup studies due to the tendency to view civil-military relations "through the lens of the liberal-democratic principle that *elected civilian officials must be supreme over the military*."[9] Researchers and policymakers struggle to imagine a scenario in which civilians would ever invite soldiers into politics. Any attempt to reconstruct societal-military relationships in order to account for civilian coup advocacy should begin with the contested concept of the nation-state—the development of which has demarcated the boundary between civilians and public (i.e., "state") soldiers.

States and the Separation of Civilians and Soldiers

The rise of the modern state in Europe can be marked by a shift in weapon ownership from the hands of aristocratic, feudal, and tribal lords to the abstract notion of the public sphere. In theory, this gave the "public" control over the means of organized violence.[10] As such, the responsibility for the provision of order moved from those with a direct stake in administering violence to make and protect their wealth (e.g., feudal lords over peasants) to an intangible network of agents with an indirect stake in the extraction of resources for the sake of "public" welfare. "The rise of the modern state," writes Jeffrey Winters, "marked the first time oligarchs were disarmed and no

longer ruled directly."[11] As this process unfolded in Iraq, for instance, the British-backed central government sometimes failed to provide order, such as during its withdrawal from Dīwāniyyah in 1922. In response, the shaikhs of the landed estates (*muqataʿah*) relied more nakedly on the violence of their *hūshiyyah* (guard), the role of which was to secure "the shaikh, execute his will, supervise his peasants, and protect his properties."[12]

The dramatic changes in the way violence was coming to be organized in Europe and its colonial territories produced a simultaneous *ideational* transformation. The physical rise of the state produced the "public sphere,"[13] meaning a *private* civil society standing in binary opposition to *public* political authority. That is, states and societies (the public and private spheres) co-constitute one another; the idea of the state is dependent on the non-state (society).[14] Societies call states into existence by acknowledging and consenting to the authority of state officials to "legitimately" administer violence. In this situation it is possible to imagine how to best maintain societal control over the state's violent apparatus, especially mass armies. For instance, Samuel Huntington's seminal *Soldier and the State*—which has significantly shaped the study of civil-military relations—encouraged the maintenance of an analytical boundary between public officials and soldiers.[15] Samuel Finer inquired in one of the earliest studies of coups d'état: why would organized purveyors of violence ever obey civilian masters?[16] "Simply put," asks Milan Svolik, "why is it that in some countries, those with guns obey those without guns?"[17] This analytical separation is nicely captured in Peter Feaver's summary of the motivating question behind research on civilian control: who will guard the guardians?[18] In a world of states, societies need armies to safeguard their sovereignty, but who will protect society from the state's soldiers?

The ideal-typical boundary (public/state versus private-society), which underlies current conceptualizations of civil-military relationships, implicitly assumes that those who enter state

institutions (those who become agents of the state or public servants, e.g., soldiers, bureaucrats) adopt an attachment to a *public* identity. Politicians and soldiers in post-colonial Iraq and Syria, however, displayed greater attachment to their own ideological groupings than to public institutions like the state, parliament, or national army.

Timothy Mitchell has argued that rather than re-producing disputed understandings of the state, researchers should instead continuously (re)-interpret the evolving social relationships that define and re-define the mutually co-constitutive boundary that marks the *public* and the *private*.[19] In other words, there is no state and society; there is only a society that discursively constructs and is constructed by the concept of distinct *public* and *private* spheres.[20] Relationships between civilians and soldiers are at once *public* and *private*. Depending on socio-historical circumstances, social agents retain greater or lesser degrees of attachment to their private identities when they become bureacrats, police, or soldiers. Across time and space, variations in partisanship, family values, ethnic ties, and other identity groupings, will influence each new cadet's level of attachment to prior ideological commitments.

Early accounts of post-colonial Middle East coups tended to argue that the region's militaries intervened to provide order in societies with otherwise disorganized, corrupt, and/or illegitimate civilian institutions. The scholar of Turkey, Dankwart Rustow, articulated perhaps the earliest version of this argument:

> Turkish citizens looking for leadership in the impending struggle for national independence could well ask (as did Gamal Abd al-Nasir and his fellow-conspirators against the corrupt regime of King Faruq a generation later): *'If the Army does not do this job, who will?* '[21]

This line of argument is problematic because it imputes cohesion to Middle East armies where none existed. The story of the region's post-colonial coups was not one of ambitious officers acting on behalf of organizationally coherent militaries to end their countries's political crises and establish order. The officers with which students of the era are familiar were aiders and abetters of

crises they helped create as partners in revolutionary civil-military alliances. In fact, they did not reduce military interventions but rather produced them.

Coup cascades in Iraq and Syria, in other words, were not due to *exogenous* forces, i.e., feeble institutional structures external to the actors operating within them. The problem was *endogenous;* revisionist party leaders, a subset of the Iraqi and Syrian elite, felt little attachment (if any) to the public institutions in existence at the inception of their young nations' statehood. The French and British Mandates nurtured a class of salaried legal-bureaucratic managers, or *effendiyya* (singular: *effendi*), which in the post-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire denoted bureaucrats who adopted Western mores and professions. *Effendis* from Beirut to Cairo to Baghdad were influenced by the rise of global radicalism in the late 19th century and early 20th century. They shaped fresh ideas (e.g., anarchism, Marxism, social nationalism) to local circumstances.[22] Urbanization, improved literacy, and the growth of communication technologies (e.g., the radio, transistor), as Elie Kedourie wrote, "…[C]reated new…possibilities of canalizing hitherto untapped sources of political power by organizing the passive and malleable mass into a formidable phalanx round a leader and his slogans."[23] What we can take from this is that revolutionary-minded *effendis* began to organize mass-based political parties. Rather than rely on narrow patron-client relationships, these parties made ideological appeals to the dispossessed masses. They aimed to replace the dominant post-colonial system of elite privileges that benefitted owners of land and capital, who enflamed class tension by flaunting a decadent lifestyle.[24]

Importantly, it was often these civilian party leaders—far from the victims of ambitious officers—who decided to enlist soldiers in their revolutionary movements. Iraqi and Syrian *effendiyya* and the soldiers who joined their revolutionary movements—which Michael Eppel refers to as "*effendiyya* in uniform"[25]—collapsed the distinction between civil-military spheres.

Disaggregating post-colonial Iraqi and Syrian armies reveals that they were not unitary organizations with high institutional capacity. They were divided by the same social cleavages which afforded factions of the civilian political class the opportunity to infiltrate their respective military academies. In a vicious cycle, party infiltration further factionalized already divided armies. Ba'thist, Arab Socialist, Communist, and Arab Nationalist soldiers were party members first, soldiers second. As will be revealed from party debates, the civilian leadership of these political parties thought they could maintain control over their army partisans after seizing power.

Debating Revolution and Coups

Civilian party leaders who advocated for coups in post-colonial Iraq and Syria had, puzzlingly, also internalized the anti-coup norms by then typical of nation-states. This is clear from their private and public deliberations about the proper role of the armed forces in their revolutionary programs.

Iraq, 1936-41

From the moment of Iraq's emergence out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, civilians and soldiers of similar class backgrounds and ideological orientations converged in conspiratorial groups. Ottoman officers from the Iraqi province were exposed to nationalistic ideas in Baghdad's Rashidiyya military school and in Istanbul's Harbiye Military Academy. The Committee for Union and Progress's (an outgrowth of the Young Turk movement founded in 1887) "Turkification" policies, moreover, spawned conspiratorial networks of Arab nationalists. For example, in 1913-14, Egyptian 'Aziz 'Ali al-Misri founded the Covenant*/al-'Ahd,* most members of which were officers from the provinces of Iraq but based in Istanbul, including future soldiers-turned-

politicians Nuri al-Sa‘id, Ja‘afar al-Askari, Yasin al-Hashimi, Jamil al-Midfai, Naji Shawkat, Mawlud Mukhlis, and Ali Jawdat. Many of these individuals became prominent coup advocates during Iraq’s first coup cascade from 1936-41.

One of the spaces in which Iraqi civilians and military officers gathered was in the military academies. The Iraqi Military College (est. 1921; re-named the Royal Iraq Military College at Rustamiyah in 1924) and the Iraqi Staff College (est. 1928). Without British knowledge, Iraqi instructors conveyed anti-colonial and pan-Arab themes to cadets. For example, ex-Ottoman officer Tawfiq Hussein did not believe in apolitical militaries and viewed Iraq as an Arab Prussia which would use its military to establish a pan-Arab state, thus reclaiming the Arab nation’s “past glories.” Hussein taught several notable officers, like Bakr al-Sidqi, Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, and Mahmoud al-Durra, encouraging them to adopt his pan-Arabist views and take an active role in Iraqi political life.[26] Likewise, Syrian pan-Arabist Sati’ al-Husri followed Faisal to Iraq from Damascus to serve as Director General of Education (1923-27), from which he instilled militant pan-Arabism into hundreds if not thousands of Iraqi students. Husri’s curriculum, referred to as *husriyya*, fused Iraqi and Arab nationalism. It argued that the Iraqi Army should craft citizen-soldiers who would use the military to liberate Iraq from British control and then forcefully lay the groundwork for a pan-Arab nation-state. Many cadets were raised on *husriyya* curriculum before enlisting.

With a politicized army that was badly divided between Iraqi nationalists (e.g., Bakr al-Sidqi) and pan-Arab nationalists (e.g., Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh), there were abundant opportunities for civilian politicians to enlist soldiers in their schemes. As one British official noted:

> Intrigue is to be found everywhere and is not confined to army matters; *officers mix freely with the local politicians and are prepared to follow anyone who they think will benefit*

> *them*…. At present there is no reason to suppose that they would refuse to do what they were ordered providing it was not dangerous.[27]

Prominent politicians like Iraq's first Defense Minister, Ja'far al-'Askari, and his ally and brother-in-law, Nuri al-Sa'id, who held several executive posts including Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army, both cultivated army contacts. Moreover, the emergence of "an Iraqi intelligentsia" in the 1930s greatly expanded ideological cliques in the Iraqi Army, producing a civil-military symbiosis. Socialist, Communist, and fascist thought captured the minds of many officers. Zaki Khayri, the leader of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), circulated Communist ideas throughout the armed forces, placing special emphasis on lower- to middle-ranked soldiers. He established the Communist Military Committee for this purpose. The ICP managed to infiltrate Kirkuk's Second Army Division and maintain contacts with a secret network of sympathetic officers in other divisions as well.[28]

Another venue in which civilians cultivated military allies was in the Muthanna Club/*Nadi al-Muthanna* (founded 1935, Baghdad). Dedicated to propagating pan-Arab thought, the Club's membership was composed mostly of middle-income Sunni Arabs, including merchants and educators, and politicians who aggressively courted officers in order to infiltrate the armed forces.[29] The Club's Vice-President was Mohamed Mahdi Kubbah, who in the post-WWII era founded the officer-recruiting Independence Party/*Hizb al-Istiqlal*.[30] The prominent pan-Arabist in charge of Iraq's curriculum, Sati' al-Husri, frequently spoke at the Club's meetings, as well as his successor Sami Shawkat, founder of the para-military youth-group *Futuwwa*.[31] Ex-Sharifian officer-turned-politician and eventual premier, Yasin al-Hashimi, nurtured a relationship with Col. Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh through Muthanna.[32] Yasin's brother Taha al-Hashimi, the eventual Chief of the General Staff, funded the militant Palestine Defense League (PDL) with assistance from the Club's membership.

Opposed to the pan-Arab Muthanna Club was an equivalent Iraq First nationalist (*wataniyyun*) association, *Jama'at al-Ahali* (People's Group). The group was linked to the newspaper *Al-Ahali* (est. 1931), which was created by a young lawyer named Muhammad Hadid alongside other young, foreign-educated Iraqis. *Al-Ahali* preached social-democratic reforms and *sha'biyya*, or "welfare for all the people," as well as liberation from the British.[33] *Al-Ahali's* membership wished to upend their country's established elite and "transform Iraq into a modern, democratic state, by means of far-ranging change in Iraqi society."[34] *Al-Ahali* was highly critical of incumbent elites's electoral manipulation and the patron-client relationships that they used, as Charles Tripp put it, "to cement an 'establishment' which successfully excluded most other aspirants to power and used their state offices to entrench their positions as major landowners in Iraqi society."[35] The group's membership included Iraq's first civilian coup advocate, politician Hikmat Suleyman.

As the Iraqi establishment hobbled along, modernizers like Suleyman "began to *advocate a radical change* in the form of government," including by handing over the reigns of power to officers.[36] British Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr called Suleyman a "Voltairian Republican" due to his anti-establishmentarianism.[37] Adding to Suleyman's frustration with the political system, Suleyman's former ally, premier Yasin al-Hashimi, had made an enemy when in 1935 he denied Suleyman the Interior portfolio. PM Hashimi became an obstacle in the way of Suleyman's desired Atatürk-esque reform program. Fed up with the establishment, Suleyman and other *effendis* tried to use their overrepresentation in the printing houses to intensify a war against the incumbents. This proved futile and, due to the unfair electoral system, they were "incapable of reaching the foci of power and control within the state."[38] Revealing that the coup tactic was only a method of last resort, Suleyman noted, "There was *nothing left for us except the Army… so we*

resorted to the Army."[39] Ambassador Kerr nicely summarized Suleyman's thought process:

> Of late…his growing irritation against the Government had become more and more marked. He had begun to gather about him a number of men, including Jafar-abu-Timman, who shared his disliking for the constant use of martial law, the abuses in the distribution of State lands, the provocative display of wealth, in the shape of houses and motor cars, by high Government servants and so on…. *It is to be assumed that it was at this stage that he took the course of turning for help to Bekr Sidqi*… It was a dangerous course, but it is to be presumed that a man like the new Prime Minister [Suleyman] did not take it without forethought.[40]

Suleyman indeed displayed considerable forethought. His first step in seizing power was to convince members of *al-Ahali* that their desired reforms would be possible under his post-coup cabinet and to reassure them that an "alliance with the Army *would not lead to a military dictatorship*."[41] Suleyman's calculation soon proved wrong as Gen. Bakr al-Sidqi garnered more power than the civilians who helped him seize power. Nevertheless, Suleyman's and *Ahali's* concerns suggest they were aware of anti-coup norms and were genuinely committed to returning the military to its proper place in the barracks after the coup d'état.[42]

Iraqi politicians were deeply uncomfortable with the military's entrance into political affairs. After the 1936 coup, Suleyman noted that it was their last desperate choice.[43] The new premier's government tried to justify the coup on the basis of its left-wing policy platform. "In a November radio broadcast," write Al-Marashi and Salama, "in an *almost apologetic tone*, the Sulayman government justified its cooperation with the 'gallant army officers' promising that they would strengthen the pride of the nation, the Army, in addition to delivering reforms of education, unemployment and land distribution."[44] Likewise, politician Tawfiq Suweidi (an ex-Ottoman and ex-Sharifian officer, and a member of *al-'Ahd*) and Saddam Hussein's uncle, Brigadier Khairallah Talfah, both expressed discomfort with the coup d'état.[45] Gen. Taha al-Hashimi called the 1936 coup "shameful,"[46] even though he advocated for subsequent coups alongside another soldier-turned-politician, Nūrī al-Sā'īd. Three days after Gen. Sidqi's assassination in 1937, one of the

conspirators, Mosul's Gen. Amin al-Umari, released a "manifesto" in which he placed conditions in front of outgoing PM Suleyman, including ridding the army of those who supported the 1936 coup and legislation to forbid "participation in politics by army leaders."[47] Again in February-March 1938 the question of the military's role in politics surfaced in Iraq's lower chamber during a debate over indemnity for the anti-Sidqi-Suleyman conspirators. Opponents to indemnification, such as coup advocate Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani, felt it would incentivize future military interference.[48]

Iraqi politicians' concern that the 1936 coup had undermined the norm of civilian control over the army proved to be well founded. Iraq was gripped by several more coups until British re-occupation in 1941. Col. Sabbagh recalled in his memoirs how Iraqi politicians sought alliances with officers to overthrow rival cabinets, such as "Rustam Haidar because he is a Shi'a…another because he is a traitor…and another because he is a communist…."[49] On December 24, 1938, targeted the pan-Arab cabinet of PM Jamīl Midfaʿī, who had replaced Suleyman's cabinet. Nūrī al-Sāʿīd promised a conglomerate of then-powerful pan-Arabist officers that he could do more than Midfaʿī had for the Palestinian cause.[50] In a straight-forward example of civilian coup advocacy, Sāʿīd "used the army to re-establish himself in power."[51] A British official reported that:

> … [The Iraqi] Parliament as a means of effecting a smooth transition from one Government to another, has failed. The politicians have developed the habit of furthering their ambitions by extra-parliamentary methods. The army has been introduced into politics, and politics have introduced themselves into the army. There is a tendency for the various politicians to court different army cliques, and for high officers, in their turn, to develop political ambitions.[52]

Sāʿīd's role in the affair, according to the British, "was probably much the same as Hikmat Sulaiman's in the military revolt led by Bakr Sidqi."[53] Sāʿīd gave advance notice of his coup to British Ambassador Oswald Scott. In a nod to British commitment to anti-coup norms, the Ambassador claimed to have done all that "lay within my power to dissuade him [Sāʿīd] from the

course he has now adopted."[54]

One ironic facet of the December 1938 coup is that many of those politicians who had expressed antipathy toward the army's newfound political role participated in Sāʿīd's coup. The conspiracy included politicians Rashid ʿAli al-Gailani, Naji Shawkat, Nasrat al-Farisi, Ibrahim Kamal, Taha al-Hashimi, and possibly Rustum Haidar. Rashid 'Ali, Taha, and Sāʿīd believed the Seven was "the most powerful vehicle to allow them to regain complete control over the government."[55] In fact, this group had been plotting with Nuri since at least two weeks after the 1937 coup. Taha al-Hashimi's diary entry for 31 August 1937 read:

> It is apparent to me from my conversation with Rashīd ʿAli [al-Gailani]…that he made an agreement with Naji Shawkat to act when the opportunity came. He is acting with Nūrī [al-Sāʿīd] and Nasrat [al-Farisi]. Ibrahim Kamal also showed his desire to work with him because he believes that Jamīl's cabinet [*wizāra*] will not last. Rashīd says: 'he [Kamal] informed Naji Shawkat of my involvement with him in the action [*al-ʿamal*].'[56]

Itching to be back in power, the conspirators took assistance from "any dissatisfied elements" they could contact, including the Muthanna Club-backed Palestine Defense Society, in which Col. Sabbagh was involved and Taha al-Hashimi was President, and the German Legation, an ally that was courted after the Midfa'i government's declaration of solidarity with Britain amidst the growing war crisis in Europe.[57]

Syria, 1940-1963

Constrained by WWII, British officials were unwilling to countenance continuing instability in the Iraqi cabinet after a pro-Axis coup in 1941 led by politician Rashid 'Ali al-Gaylani. The British re-invaded Iraq and reversed the gains of Gaylani's coup movement. One of the refugees of the Anglo-Iraq War in 1941 was a young coup advocate from Hama, left-wing nationalist Akram al-Hawrani, who organized a trip to Iraq with his *Hizb al-Shabab*/Party of the Youth (*Shabab*) to support Gaylani's "Arab revolution." After Britain's re-occupation, Hawrani and his youth group

were arrested and given over to French officials who placed them in Deir Ezzor prison. Aside from a "hot metal cage," the prison was, in Hawrani's words, "a great place for meeting revolutionaries," such as officers of the *Troupes Spéciales* like Jamal Faysal and Faysal al-Atassi, as well as other high-ranking soldiers of the Atassi family.[58] Hawrani's journey to Iraq "opened his eyes to the potential *power of a partnership between the army and the common folk*."[59] Hawrani recalled an especially illuminating moment at Iraq's Husaybeh border crossing:

> …[T]he guards greeted us with a lukewarm welcome. Then our three officers yanked off their civilian clothes and dressed in their military uniforms, which they had hidden. The situation changed, and the guard asked us to wait by the post, until they got the order to allow us to enter Iraq and go to Baghdad, and the response from Baghdad was to welcome our approach.[60]

This provided Hawrani an early example of "how powerful a weapon a politically-conscious officer corps could be," wrote Patrick Seale, "and what fertile ground the cadets at the Homs military college provided for his ideas."[61]

Hawrani never seemed to have any concern about the coup strategy. Even before Gaylani's coup movement in Iraq, Hawrani had joined Antun Saadeh's *Parti Populaire Syrien*/Syrian Social Nationalist Party (PPS/SSNP) in 1936.[62] Hailing from Hama, Hawrani was attracted to Saadeh's anti-feudal message. Hawrani later broke with PPS/SSNP and formed his own party, the Arab Socialist Party/*Ḥizb al-Ishtirakiyeen al-ʿArab* (ASP), which immediately went to work infiltrating the Homs Military Academy.

Michel ʻAflaq, Jalal al-Sayyad, and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, the leaders of the Arab Resurrection Party/*Hizb al-Baʿth al-ʿArabi* (ARP), were more reticent to draw the army into politics. They all expressed discomfort with the idea of enlisting soldiers in their movement. Internal party discussions held throughout the 1940s over the military's potential for actualizing ʻAflaq's desired *Inqilab* (social revolution; literally: "turning over," but incidentally also the Arabic word for "coup") revealed two tendencies. One held that military intervention in domestic

politics are acceptable only if they benefit the party but are otherwise unacceptable. ‘Aflaq, Sayyad, and Bitar professed the second viewpoint, which argued that military intervention is never acceptable, even if in the interest of the ARP.[63] The pro-coup wing, which urged a joining of forces with the country’s other pro-coup socialists, eventually prevailed. This eventually gave birth to the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party/*Ḥizb al-Ba‘th al-‘Arabi al-Ishtiraki* (ASRP/*al-Ba’th*), when the ARP pacted with Syria’s most active coup advocate, Akram al-Hawrani, and his ASP.

Even though the amalgamated ASRP began to routinely stage coups, starting with the 1954 overthrow of President (and Colonel) Adib al-Shishakli, the party never referred to their activities as coup-like. For instance, after the 8 March 1963 coup, the Syrian Ba‘thist mouthpiece, *al-Ba‘th*, described their action as revolutionary (see Figures 1 and 2). This is also a common theme in contemporary Arab coups. Even with the backing of the *Tamarod* demonstrations in July 2013, General ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi took pains to “create the impression” he had seized power “very reluctantly, at the request of the Egyptian people.”[64] His media backers persistently claimed, “Morsi’s removal constituted a revolution, *not a coup*.”[65]

Figure 1. Front page headline from 16 March 1963: "The forces of unity are designed to protect the *revolution* [of 8 March 1963]."

Figure 2. Center, second and third lines down from top, in that order (16 March 1963): "The masses/people...revolve around our *Arab revolution* [of 8 March 1963]."

The Syrian Communist Party/*Al-Ḥizb ash-Shuyūʿī as-Sūrī* (SCP) infiltrated the Syrian Army but the extent to which the decision to do so was deliberated is, as far as I am aware, unknown. That is probably due to SCP leader Khāled Bakdāsh's tight grip on party decision-making.[66] What is clear is that leading Syrian Communists were represented in the army. For instance, in his memoirs, Col. Afif al-Bizri, a prominent pro-Communist officer who was involved in revolutionary politics in the 1950s, referred to the Egyptian Free Officers coup in 1952 as an "army revolution" (*thawrat al-jaysh*) rather than the more straightforward term "military coup" (*inqilab 'askari*). He took pains to articulate the special circumstances of anti-colonial struggle that justified the Free Officers coup.[67] Bizri's use of this qualifying language suggests he was uncomfortable with the term "coup," but supportive of the military taking an active role in revolutionary politics.

A Turkish Connection?

There is a current of thought that Turkey serves as a model for the Arab world (see, e.g., Kirişci 2013; Jabbour 2015; Khatib and Ghanem 2018). As mentioned earlier, Syrian and Iraqi officers who served under the Ottoman Empire colluded with civilian politicians in their newly established nation-states. Moreover, Iraqi First nationalists Hikmat Suleyman and Gen. Sidqi (an ex-Ottoman officer) were both strong admirers of Kemal Atatürk.[68] In contrast to the Iraq Firsters, the pan-Arabist slogan was "an Arab Iraq."[69] Although pan-Arabist Salah al-Din as-Sabbagh also admired Atatürk, his admiration began and ended at the Turkish military's lead role in achieving independence. Sabbagh and his associates in the Golden Square and Muthanna Club dreamed of a massive Iraqi Army, the biggest in the Arab world that would, similar to the Turkish Armed Forces, violently re-unify Arab territories.[70]

There was plenty of public encouragement for coups in postwar Turkey, although it is unclear if Turkish coup advocates were in contact with or learning from Syrian or Iraqi party leaders. In the 1960s, the Turkish left wrote extensively of the armed forces as a *revolutionary* agent—a "striking force" to be exact—in the journals *Yön* (Direction, 1961-67) and *Devrim* (Revolution, 1969-71). As Özgür Mutlu Ulus has described at length, together *Yön-Devrim* (Direction-Revolution) constituted a pro-coup movement led by Doğan Avcıoğlu, the editor and main ideologue of *Yön*. Avcıoğlu co-founded *Devrim* along with Mümtaz Soysal, the outlet's main thinker. *Yön-Devrim* proposed an alliance with the military to seize Kemalist state-capitalist institutions and directing them toward a model of state-socialism (neo-*étatisme*) with a progressive development model that included "agrarian reform to end the exploitive and semi-feudal relations in the land-holding system."[71] The voices of *Yön-Devrim*, dubbed the "media of the coup," argued that socialist revolution was most likely to succeed by coup; called on army partisans to join them; established contacts with officers; and were implicated in several coup attempts. There is some speculation that *Yön's* editorial pressure might have been one reason why İsmet İnönü advocated for the May 1960 coup. İnönü had long sought to avoid a coup, preferring soldiers to remain outside the halls of power, until finally inciting several officers to "revolution" from his private residence that spring.[72]

The pages of *Yön-Devrim* represented a variety of leftist thought on the topic of the military in politics. Although the Communist Party of Turkey/*Türkiye Komünist Partisi* (CPT/TKP) may have been the first to infiltrate the Turkish Armed Forces/*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri* (TAF/TSK), after the CPT/TKP's eradication from Turkish soil in the early 1950s its representatives discussed in *Yön* its unsettled position on the army's role in revolution. Having been kicked out of the CPT/TKP in the 1930s, Dr. Hikmet Kıvılcımlı started the "Kıvılcımlı Movement" and the associated National

Party/*Vatan Parti* (est. 1954). These organizations espoused their belief in a revolutionary alliance between the working-class and the "progressive" army as a "striking force."[73] Mihri Belli, the ideological leader of the National Democratic Revolution/*Milli Demokratik Devrimciler* (NDR/MDD), shared this position with Kıvılcımlı. Also visible in *Yön's* pages was a disagreement between Belli's NDR/MDD and the Workers's Party of Turkey/*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* (WP/TİP) over questions like, "Who would be the leader of the revolutionary struggle—the working class or the military-civilian intelligentsia?" and "How would power be seized—through parliamentary or revolutionary methods?" The conflict over WP/TİP's reluctance to enlist the army in revolutionary politics eventually led its leadership to expel Belli's NDR/MDD from the party. While WP/TİP lauded Turkey's 27 May 1960 coup and welcomed soldiers into the party, its leadership did not support advocating for a second coup after May 1960. This disagreement was so subtle that when the WP/TİP's internal discussions devolved into criticism of the CHP and NDR/MDD's pro-coup stance, the WP/TİP ended up conducting "an investigation of the potentiality of the bureaucracy, intellectuals and…military officers in leading a probable revolutionary action."[74]

Gambling on Coups

If an anti-coup norm was present—to the extent that the transgression of this norm evoked careful deliberation—then why did nearly all of these parties, at one time or another, risk their necks by gambling on coups? Coup advocates were represented on both the left and the right, but all of them wished to do away with their existing political systems. For example, before Antun Saadeh's execution for his alleged role in a coup attempt in Lebanon, his PPS/SSNP railed against feudalistic landlords and other perceived socially regressive institutions, including the religious

establishment. In a speech to party members on 1 June 1935, Saadeh explicitly attacked the Lebanese and Syrian elite:

> Some people took up the leadership of this popular dissatisfaction and exploited it in order to obtain the positions they sought, and they bolstered up this leadership by the remains of family power derived from the principles of a bygone age—principles which consider the people as herds to be disposed of by certain families, dissipating the interests of the people for the sake of their personal power. And when these so-called leaders found that the family and the home were not sufficient in this age to maintain their power, they resorted to certain words beloved by the people—the words of liberty, independence, and principles—and they played upon these words…which are corrupt when they are a means to assuming leadership and a screen behind which lurk ambition and private aims.[75]

Likewise, as the Ba'th Party's ideologue, Michel 'Aflaq wished to "overturn" (*inqilab*) Syria's system of conservative traditionalism; the Ba'th would be the vanguard "Party of the Upheaval [*Hizb al-Inqilab*]."[76] In 'Aflaq's mind, as Nabil Kaylani wrote, the Syrian state apparatus:

> *…had to be freed from the grip of the privileged classes*, considered to be custodians of the feudal past, and intrinsically opposed to the idea of the *Inqilab*. For that purpose 'Aflaq and his supporters advocated the prompt implementation of a radical program of socialism designed to eradicate the economic power, and hence political domination, of the big landowners, business and commercial magnates, and give the people a stronger sense of belonging to society through direct ownership of land and plant.[77]

A Syrian Christian and socialist, 'Aflaq articulated a *secular* pan-Arabism while courting adherents to Islam and opposing the institutionalization of religion in the state. The Ba'th's secular-leftist appeal struck at the legitimacy of a wealthy and largely Sunni elite that was content to rule Syria and thus uninterested in Ba'thist proposals for Arab-unity.

Before joining forces with 'Aflaq's ARP, Akram al-Hawrani's Arab Socialists strove "to emancipate the peasants in the muhafaza of Hama [his hometown] from the shackles of feudal control."[78] Hawrani was antipathetically opposed to Hama's landlords, especially the 'Azms, Kaylanis, and Barazis, "who ruled over the region with ruthless and unchecked power."[79] Hawrani's friend and fellow party member 'Izz al-Din Dīāb reported several stories of Hawrani's "brave" street fights with the Barazi (and 'Azm) sons.[80] These three families gained significant

influence over the Syrian state, especially through the gendarmerie. Hawrani wanted to destroy their "monopoly of property and power" and "set fire to their houses and drive them off the land."[81] Landlord and one-time Prime Minister Husni al-Barazi remarked of Hawrani, "…[I]f he could have drunk our blood and eaten our flesh he would have done so."[82] The authorities did not hesitate to harass Hawrani, such as suspending his newspaper in 1947.[83] In 1949 witnesses even spotted Hawrani and fellow leftist Faydi Atassi with submachine guns engaged in an assault on the Syrian Ministry of Defense alongside soldiers of the Syrian Army.[84]

Restrictive political systems also created incentives for extra-legal political tactics by directly excluding the opposition from positions of influence. Adel Beshara describes this as the politics of frustration in explaining why the PPS/SSNP attempted a coup in Lebanon in 1961.[85] That same year, Syrian Ba'thist Salah al-Din al-Bitar lost an electoral contest tilted in favor of the incumbent. His "exclusion from power…played no small part" in the Ba'th's decision to "choose the road of conspiracy."[86] Turkey's leftist quarterly *Yön* contemptuously viewed the pursuit of socialist revolution through elections as "parliamentarism [*parlamentoculuk*]."[87] *Yön's* editor and chief ideologue, Doğan Avcıoğlu, "advocated revolution through a coup, *because the restrictions that he saw meant that the door to a popular struggle or a working-class revolution was closed*."[88] Akram al-Hawrani's peasant following in feudalistic Hama secured him a seat in Damascus, but he relied on army threats in the chambers because his co-radicals struggled at the polls. Turkey's WP/TİP worked toward the socialist revolution through parliamentary means but could not win enough seats to satisfy increasingly frustrated party members like the faction that broke off and formed NDR/MDD, whose adherents were leading proponents of a coup.[89]

Conclusions & Implications

The norm that preserves a separation between civilians and soldiers is meant to protect civilians from the predations of organized state violence. Yet civilians in the Arab world have, since the development of the modern nation-state, been responsible for undermining the norm of civilian supremacy over the armed forces. Party leaders in post-colonial Syria and Iraq (and Turkey) were not powerless victims of armed men. They were political agents who possessed strong ideological followings and made crucial choices about how to use their sway over officers in political competition with their establishment rivals. Time and again, they chose to undermine the norm proscribing army involvement in politics. In doing so, they opened the door to future coups by eroding the social trust required to maintain separate civil-military boundaries. The essay has shown that many of the same politicians who worried about military involvement in politics eventually enlisted soldiers in their violent schemes, placing themselves and their denizens at risk of physical harm.

This dynamic is evident in contemporary politics. For example, business and political interests conspired with Egyptian officers in July 2013 to re-establish an updated version of the ruling regime that had prevailed under Hosni Mubarak.[90] In post-colonial Iraq and Syria, party leaders and their army partisans held greater attachment to their own political program than to their existing regime structures. Ba‘thist soldiers were party members first and soldiers second. Likewise, Egyptian businesspersons, politicians, and talk show hosts felt they had more in common with like-minded soldiers than they did with their Islamist counterparts. Rather than align with civilians in the Muslim Brotherhood against the military, oligarchs and liberal politicians aligned with soldiers against the Brotherhood. As Syrian and Iraqi coup advocates learned from

the ascendance to power of Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, for their efforts Egyptian elites seem to have found something worse in Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

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Notes

[1] See, e.g., Majid Khadduri, "Constitutional Development in Syria: With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950," *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 2 (1951): 137-160; Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965/1986); Gordon Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958* (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1964); Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963-66: The Army-Party Symbiosis* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1972); Khayrīa Qāsimīa, *Mudhakirrat Muhsen al-Barazi, 1948-49* [Memoirs of Muhsen al-Barazi, 1948-49] (Beirut: Al-Rawwād, 1994); Nabil M. Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958: Political Success, Party Failure," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3, no. 1 (1972): 3-23; Youssef Chaitani, *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon*: *The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007); Charles Tripp, *A history of Iraq* (3rd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Joel D. Parker, "The Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani Revolt and Syrian Youth: An Insider's Account," *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 6, no. 2 (2015): 147-163; for a lengthy discussion of this literature, see Drew Holland Kinney, "Politicians at Arms: Civilian Recruitment of Soldiers for Middle East Coups," *Armed Forces & Society* 45, no. 4 (2019): 681-701.

[2] Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1 (1960): 19-44; Khadduri, "Constitutional Development in Syria"; Bernard Vernier, *Armée et Politique au Moyen-Orient* [Army and politics of the Middle East] (Paris: Payot, 1966); Seale, *The struggle for Syria*; Torrey, *Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958*; Qāsimīa, *Mudhakirrat Muhsen al-Barazi, 1948-49*; George Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East Volume 2: The Arab States Part I: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan* (1st ed.) (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1971); Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958"; Chaitani, *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon*; Tripp, *A history of Iraq*. There are only three English-language studies of civilian coup-involvement, and one Arabic-language study. All focus on a single country or single case and all were written by scholars of the Middle East. These are: Adel Beshara, *Lebanon: The Politics of Frustration: The Failed Coup of 1961* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Stephanie Cronin, *Soldiers, Shahs and Subalterns in Iran: Opposition, Protest and Revolt, 1921-1941* (New York: Palgrave, 2010); Özgür Mutlu Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey: Military Coups, Socialist Revolution and Kemalism* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010); Laith Abdul Hassan Al-Zubaidi, *Thawra 14 Tammuz 1958 fī al-Irāq* [The July 14, 1958 Revolution in Iraq] (Baghdad: Dar al-Huriyyah, 1979).

[3] See, e.g., Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 277-315; Editorial, "Lessons of Baghdad Upheaval," London *Times*, 21 February 1963; Dunkwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," *World Politics* 11, no. 4 (1959): 513-552; Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Penguin, 1962); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers and Politics:*

Military Coups and Governments (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1976); Edward N. Luttwak, *Coup d'état: A Practical Handbook* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979); Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1 (1999): 211-241; Eduardo Aléman, and Sebastien Saiegh, "Political Realignment and Democratic Breakdown in Argentina," *Party Politics* 20 no. 6 (2013): 849-886; for class-based arguments that fit this theme, see Jimmy Kandeh, *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West* Africa (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Jack Woddis, *Armies and Politics* (New York: International Publishers, 1977); Miles D. Wolpin, "Marx and Radical Militarism in the Developing Nations," *Armed Forces & Society* 4, no. 2 (1978): 245-264.

[4] This idea was espoused in early research on civil-military relations, e.g., Finer, *The Man on Horseback;* Luttwak, *Coup d'état*. Also see recent discussions of the power that civilians possess in coup movements in Kinney, "Politicians at Arms" and Drew Holland Kinney, "Sharing Saddles: Oligarchs and Officers on Horseback in Egypt and Tunisia," *International Studies Quarterly* 65, no. 2 (2021), 512-527.

[5] On the various resources available to soldiers by rank see Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

[6] 'Abd al-Karim Nahlawi, "Shahid 'Ala al-'Asr: 'Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, al-Jiza' al-Awwal" [Witness to the Era: 'Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, Part 1], *Al-Jazeera*, 25 January 2010, para. 154, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVGtDW046zY&t=232s.

[7] Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, 18-20; Eleizer Be'eri, "The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no. 1 (1982): 69-81, 75; Jonathan M. Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): 1021; Mitchell A. Seligson and Julio F. Carrión, "Political Support, Political Skepticism, and Political Stability in New Democracies: An Empirical Examination of Mass Support for Coups d'etat in Peru," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 1 (2002): 59-60; Adam Roberts, "Civil Resistance to Military Coups," *Journal of Peace Research* 12, no. 1 (1975): 19-36; Luttwak, *Coup d'état*, 57; Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594-620; John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990): 151-183; Singh, *Seizing Power*, 45; Sharan Grewal and Yasser Kureshi, "How to Sell a Coup: Elections as Coup Legitimation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 4 (2019): 1001-1031.

[8] My emphasis, Archibald Clark Kerr to Anthony Eden, 4 November 1936, telegram no. 548, Foreign Office (FO) 406/74, The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom, 202.

[9] Berk Esen and Sebnem Gumuscu, "Turkey: How the Coup Failed," *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 1 (2017): 59-73, 60.

[10] Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, eds. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946): 77-83; and see Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and the European*

State, AD 990-1990 (New York: Basil, 1990).

[11] Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 28.

[12] Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 83-84.

[13] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (translation by Thomas Burger and Fredrick Lawrence) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962/1996); Lisa Wedeen, *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 118.

[14] Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 1 (1991): 77-96; J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation," *Millennium* 17, no. 3 (1988): 429-440.

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[16] Finer, *The Man on Horseback*.

[17] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 766.

[18] Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military *Problematique*: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-178.

[19] Mitchell, "The Limits of the State."

[20] See, e.g., Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism."

[21] Emphasis added, Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," 520; also see Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares"; Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class"; Finer, *The Man on Horseback*; and Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Rustow later acknowledged that Kemal Atutürk's success, "presupposed the co-operation of organized civilian groups." Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," 539.

[22] On global radicalism, see Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, *The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013).

[23] Elie Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies* (New York: Routledge, 1974/2005), 36-37.

[24] Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," 278-279; Stefan Wild, "National Socialism in the Arab Near East Between 1933-1939," *Die Welt des Islams* 25, no. 1/4 (1985): 126-173; Michelle P. Angrist, *Party Building in the Modern Middle East* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 124-128; Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies*; Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949-1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 19-22; Majid Khadduri, "The Role of the Military in Middle East Politics," *American Political Science Review* 47, no. 2 (1953): 513; Tabitha Petran, *Syria: A Modern History* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 83-86; Toby Dodge, "From the 'Arab Awakening' to the

Arab Spring: The Post-Colonial State in the Middle East," In *After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?* ed. N. Kitchen (London: London School of Economics IDEAS Special Reports, 2012), 7.

[25] Michael Eppel, "Note About the Term *Effendiyya* in the History of the Middle East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 41, no. 3 (2009): 536.

[26] Mahmoud Durra, *Al-Harb al-'Iraqiyya al-Britaniyya* [The Iraqi-British War] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1969), 14; Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British influence," *Armed Forces & Society* 4, no. 1 (1977): 84.

[27] N.a., 17 July 1930, 1/BD56, AIR 23/120, TNA.

[28] N.a., 10 August 1939, E 5661/72/93, FO 371/23217, TNA; Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, 1168-71; Tareq Y. Ismael, *The Communist Movement in the Arab World* (New York: Routledge, 2005), 1; Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 20, 39, 54.

[29] Kedourie, *Arabic Political Memoirs*, 47; Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 38-39.

[30] Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Front Personalities in the Revolutionary Government of Iraq," n.d. 1958, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000900170001-3.pdf.

[31] William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati' Al-Husri* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). *Futuwwa* literally means "young-manliness" or "chivalry," but also connotes politico-gang activities. For a lengthy discussion of the term see Robert Irwin, "'Futuwwa': Chivalry and Gangsterism in Medieval Cairo," *Muqarnas* 21 (2004): 161-170.

[32] Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 38.

[33] Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 47.

[34] Michael Eppel, *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 41.

[35] Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 82.

[36] My emphasis, Majid Khadduri, "Iraq, 1958 and 1963," in *The Politics of the Coup D'état*, ed. William George Andrews, Uri Ra'anan, and Martin C. Needler (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company,1969), 68.

[37] Archibald Clark Kerr to Anthony Eden, 15 November 1936, telegram no. 561, FO 406/74, TNA, 204.

[38] Eppel, *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny*, 26.

[39] Emphasis added, as cited in Mohammad Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), 121.

[40] Emphasis added, Archibald Clark Kerr to Anthony Eden, 4 November 1936, telegram no. 548, FO 406/74, TNA, 200-203.

[41] My emphasis, Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 47.

[42] Archibald Clark Kerr to Anthony Eden, 4 November 1936, telegram no. 548, FO 406/74, TNA, 200-203.

[43] Archibald Clark Kerr to Anthony Eden, 20 November 1936, telegram no. 565, FO 406/74, TNA, 204-5; Tripp, *A History of Iraq*.

[44] Emphasis added, Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 49.

[45] Tawfiq Suweidi, *Mudhakarati: Nusf qurn min tarikh al-'Iraq wa al-qadiyya al-'arabiyya* [My Memoirs: Half a Century of the History of Iraq and the Arab Question], 2nd ed. (Beirut: Al-Mu'asasat Al-Arabiyya li-Darasat wa Nashr, 2010), 238; Khairullah Talfah, *Al-'Iraq fi sitt sanawat: baḥth tafṣili li-wad'a al-'Iraq al-siyasi wa-al-iqtiṣadi wa-al-'askari khilal al-muddah min 1936 li-ghayat 1941* [Iraq in Six Years: A Detailed Study of Iraq's Political, Economic and Military Situation from 1936 until 1941] (Baghdad: Matba'at al-'Abaji, 1976); Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958," 84.

[46] Taha Hashimi, *Mudhakarat Taha al-Hashimi 1919-1943* [Memoirs of Taha al-Hashimi 1919-1943] (Beirut: Dar al-Tili'a, 1967), 138.

[47] Oswald Scott to Anthony Eden, 18 August 1937, telegram no. 29, FO 406/75, TNA, 104-106; and Oswald Scott to Anthony Eden, 28 September 1937, telegram no. 34, FO 406/75, TNA, 109.

[48] Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 11 April 1938, telegram no. 38, FO 406/76, TNA, 99-100.

[49] Salah al-Din Sabbagh, *Fursan al-'Urubah fī al-'Iraq* [The Knights of Arabism in Iraq] (Damascus, n.p., 1956), 71.

[50] Col. Sabbagh, the leader of this group of "Seven," claimed his clique preferred Sāʿīd to Midfaʿī because the former offered them governmental influence. Sabbagh, *Fursan al-'Urubah fī al-'Iraq*, 133.

[51] Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax, 17 January 1940, telegram no. 24, FO 406/78, TNA, 143-4.

[52] Sir B. Newton to Viscount Halifax, 17 January 1940, telegram no. 24, FO 406/78, TNA, 143-4.

[53] Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 27 December 1939, telegram no. 29, FO 406/77, TNA, 32-33.

[54] Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 27 December 1939, telegram no. 29, FO 406/77, TNA, 32-33; and Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 27 December 1938, telegram no. 61, FO 406/76, TNA, 112.

[55] Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 56-57.

[56] Hashimi, *Mudhakarat Taha al-Hashimi, 1919-1943*, 213.

[57] Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 27 December 1938, telegram no. 61, FO 406/76, TNA, 112; Sir Maurice Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 25 January 1939, telegram no. 34, FO 406/77, TNA, 37-38.

[58] Akram Hawrani, *Mudhakarat Akram al-Hawrani* [Memoirs of Akram al-Hawrani] (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2000), 220-229; and Parker, "The Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani Revolt and Syrian Youth," 155-162. Hawrani was accompanied by three defected officers Muhammad Safa (south Lebanon), Tawfiq Shatila (Damascus), Tawfiq al-Awbri (Aleppo); as well as students, *mujahideen*, and professors. In Iraq, the group joined Syrian exiles including his uncle 'Uthman al-Hawrani, who had earlier fled to Iraq. Parker, "The Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani Revolt and Syrian Youth," 148-162.

[59] My emphasis, Parker, "The Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani Revolt and Syrian Youth," 149.

[60] Hawrani, *Mudhakarat Akram al-Hawrani*, 223-226.

[61] Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, 38.

[62] The party's name was changed in 1947 from the Syrian National Party to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Phoenix: The Revival of the Syrian Social National Party in Syria," *Die Welt Des*

Islams 47, no. 2 (2007): 188-206.

[63] See Zuhair Mardini, *Al-Ustadh: Qissa Hayya Michel 'Aflaq* [The Teacher: The Life Story of Michel 'Aflaq] (London: Riyyad El-Rayyes Books, 1988), 121-122.

[64] Patrick Kingsley, "Will #SisiLeaks be Egypt's Watergate for Abdel Fatah al-Sisi?" *The Guardian*, 5 March 2015, 10, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/05/sisileaks-egypt-watergate-abdel-fatah-al-sisi.

[65] My emphasis, Kingsley, "Will #SisiLeaks be Egypt's Watergate for Abdel Fatah al-Sisi?" 10.

[66] Central Intelligence Agency, "NSC Briefing: Communist Gains in Syria," 4 January 1955, 1, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00890A000500010028-1.pdf. Several members of the SCP's Politbureau in 1972 claimed that Bakdāsh converted "his subjective will into the law of party life." See Hanna Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

[67] Afif Bizri, *Al-Nāsiriyyah fī jumlat al-'isti'mār al-hadīth* [Nasserism in the Context of Modern Colonialism] (Damascus: Dar al-Sharq, 1962), 178.

[68] Michael Eppel, "The Hikmat Sulayman-Bakir Sidqi Government in Iraq, 1936–37, and the Palestine Question," *Middle Eastern Studies* 24, no. 1 (1988): 27; and see Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, 86.

[69] Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970), 20.

[70] Sabbagh, *Fursan al-'Urubah fī al-'Iraq*, 17, 60-1; Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces*, 39, 54.

[71] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 23.

[72] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 20-39; George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics, Part I," *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 1 (1965): 64; George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics, Part II," *Middle East Journal* 19, no. 2 (1965): 172; George S. Harris, "The Causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 24, no. 4 (1970): 442-44; Kemal H. Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays* (Boston: Brill, 2004), 247; Lerner and Robinson, "Swords and Ploughshares," 43.

[73] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, ch. 7. Suspected of scheming in the army, Kıvılcımlı fled Turkey after the 1971 coup.

[74] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, ch. 8, 75; and see Ahmad Feroz, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 145-6; Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society*, 126.

[75] My emphasis, Antun Saadeh, "Muhadarat al-za'im al-thaniyya fi al-nadwat al-thaqafiyya fi 'al-muhadarat al-'ashr" [Second lecture of the leader in the cultural symposium in 'The Ten Lectures'], *SSNP.com*, 1 June 1935, 11, http://www.ssnp.com/?page_id=344.

[76] Michel 'Aflaq, "Hizb Al-Inqilab" [The Party of the Upheaval], *Al-Baath Online*, 1949, http://albaath.online.fr/; and see Michel 'Aflaq, "Al-Ba'th Al-'Arabi Huwwa Al-Inqilab" [The Arab Baath is the Upheaval], *Al-Baath Online*, 1950, http://albaath.online.fr/. By *inqilab* he meant a socio-psychological revolution, not military coup (*inqilab 'askari*). For an extended treatment of 'Aflaq's life, see Norma Salam-Babikian, "Michel 'Aflaq: A Biographic Outline," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 2, no. 2 (1980): 162-179.

[77] My emphasis, Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958," 6.

[78] Kaylani, "The Rise of the Syrian Ba'th, 1940-1958," 8.

[79] Chris Solomon, "Akram al-Hawrani: Syria's left-wing populist and the United Arab Republic," *Medium*, 12 May 2017, 4, https://medium.com/@Christopher_Solomon/akram-al-hawrani-syrias-left-wing-populist-and-the-united-arab-republic-f1c02ae56fc7; and see Hawrani, *Mudhakarat Akram al-Hawrani*; 'Izz al-Din Dīāb, *Akram al-Hawrani Kamā 'Arafuha* [Akram al-Hawrani as I knew him] (Beirut: Bīsān, 1998).

[80] Dīāb, *Akram al-Hawrani Kamā 'Arafuha*, 25.

[81] Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, 40.

[82] Barazi, as cited in Seale, *The Struggle for Syria*, 40.

[83] Office Arabe, Bulletin de la Presse Syrien, no. 146: Supplément 17: Aperçu documentaire sur le Ministère constitué le 14 Août 1949 par Hachem al Atassi (Syrian Press Bulletin no. 146: Supplement 17: Documentary overview on the Ministry constituted on August 14, 1949 by Hachem al-Atassi), 16 August 1949, 188PO/1/7/11/39, Les Cinq Premiers Coups d'Etat Syriens (The First Five Syrian Coups d'Etat), Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres: Le Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes, 4.

[84] M. Serres, La conjuration du 14 Août (The conspiracy of August 14), 27 August 1949, 188PO/1/7/11/39, Les Cinq Premiers Coups d'Etat Syriens (The First Five Syrian Coups d'Etat), Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres: Le Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes.

[85] Beshara, *Lebanon: The politics of frustration*.

[86] Petran, *Syria*, 153.

[87] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 26.

[88] Emphasis added, Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 44.

[89] Ulus, *The Army and the Radical Left in Turkey*, 87.

[90] Kinney, "Sharing Saddles."